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"Gatekeeping" Agency Reliance on Scientific and
Technical Materials After Daubert: Ensuring
Relevance and Reliability in the Administrative
Process
Paul S. Miller, Esq. and Bert W. Rein, Esq.*
I. Introduction
The continued reduction in federal economic regulation has
been more than offset by the growth of federal environmental,
health and safety regulation through federal agencies such as the
Environmental Protection Agency, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, Consumer Product Safety Commission, or the
Food and Drug Administration. These agencies engage in a
constant stream of administrative decisions which assess the health
and safety consequences of private economic activity and the costs
and benefits of regulatory interventions intended to alleviate the
allegedly adverse consequences of that activity on human health
and/or the natural environment.' Scientific and technical analysis
is critical to the rational conduct of this regulatory process, and
agencies premise their actions on scientific and technical
information, relying both on agency expertise and expert
submissions from interested private parties. Courts reviewing
* Paul S. Miller serves as General Counsel for Pfizer, one of the world's largest
pharmaceutical companies. Bert W. Rein is a partner at the law firm Wiley,
Rein & Fielding which is located in Washington, D.C.
1 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2058 (2000) (authorizing
CPSC to promulgate consumer product safety rules); Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2000) (providing FDA authority to
promulgate regulations); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 655(b)(5) (2000) (authorizing OSHA to set standards for "toxic materials or
harmful physical agents" in the workplace); Clean Air Act, 42 § 7409(b) (2000)
(authorizing EPA to establish national ambient air quality standards).
2 See, e.g., Final Rule To Amend the Final Water Quality Guidance for the Great
Lakes System To Prohibit Mixing Zones for Bioaccumulative Chemicals of
Concern, 40 C.F.R. § 1.32 (Nov. 13, 2000); Regulations on Statements Made for
Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effect of the Product on the Structure or
Function of the Body, 21 C.F.R. § 101 (Jan. 6, 2000); Regional Haze Standards,
40 C.F.R. § 51 (July 1, 1999); Identification of Dangerous Levels of Lead, 66
Fed. Reg. 1206, 1233-1234 (Jan. 5, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 745);
EPA, Drinking Water Standard for Arsenic, Fact Sheet EPA 815-F-00-015
1
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these agency actions often defer to agency expertise on scientific
and technical issues and affirm the agency so long as the
administrative record contains some support for the agency's
conclusions and reflects some consideration of all opposing points
raised in the agency process.3
We believe that such an overly deferential standard of
judicial review cannot survive analysis under the principles laid
down by the Supreme Court in Daubert4 and its progeny and now
codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 702. In our view, those
principles require federal courts reviewing administrative actions
to enforce the same "gatekeeper" standards as those courts now
require when reviewing a trial court's treatment of scientific and
technical evidence. Judicial enforcement of "gatekeeper"
responsibilities in the administrative process should properly
discipline both agency decisionmaking and the processes by which
administrative agencies address scientific and technical issues.
There are some early encouraging indications, as discussed
below, that reviewing courts eventually will subject agencies to
Daubert discipline. As the administrative bar becomes better
acquainted with Daubert, we believe this judicial trend will
accelerate. However, the process of accommodation could and
should be further accelerated by a prompt and definitive
Presidential action revising scientific and technical decision
standards and processes for all Executive branch agencies through
an appropriate Executive Order. We present an illustrative draft of
such an Order at the conclusion of this article.
(January 2001) available at <
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/ars/arsrulefactsheet.html >.
3 E.g., Int'l Fabricare Inst. v. EPA, 972 F.2d 382,389 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(upholding drinking water standards for levels of pesticide DBCP and solvent
"perc"); Trinity American Corp. v. EPA, 150 F.3d 389, 395 (4th Cir. 1998)
(upholding emergency order requiring monitoring of foam plant); Hells Canyon
Preservation Council v. Jacoby, 9 F.Supp.2d 1216, 1239-1240 (D. Or. 1998)
(rejecting conservation group's challenge to categorical exclusion finding under
the National Environmental Policy Act).
4 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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II. The Supreme Court's Daubert Cases - Critical
Discipline For Scientific And Technical Decisions
A. The New Erpert-Evidence Review Process -
Ensuring Scientific And Technical "Relevance"
And "Reliability "
The Supreme Court's Daubert, Joiner, Kumho and
Weisgram decisions firmly established and substantially defined
the role of federal judges as substantive "gatekeepers" when
parties attempt to use .expert scientific and technical evidence to
prove their cases in court.5 Daubert initiated the concept of a
gatekeeper role for the trial judge in respect to "scientific" expert
testimony offered under the old Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
requiring the judge to determine whether a proffered expert
opinion is both "reliable" and "relevant" to the issue at bar.
Proposed expert evidence that is not both reliable and
relevant must be excluded from consideration by the finder of fact
as being "speculation," rather than "knowledge." Justice
Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Daubert began with Rule 702
language providing that, "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trial of fact," an expert "may
testify thereto,"6 and reasoned that "the word 'knowledge'
connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.",7
Qualifying scientific knowledge is "derived by the scientific
method" and expert opinion "testimony must be supported by
appropriate validation - i.e. 'good grounds,' based on what is
known."
8
The Supreme Court's 1999 Kumho decision subsequently
made express that the obligation to "ensure that any and all
scientific testimony is not only relevant, but reliable" equally
"applies to all expert testimony."9 Where called into question, the
s See Dauber v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), 113 S.
Ct. 2786; General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997);
and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999);
Weisgram v. Marlay Co., 528 U.S. 440, 120 S. Ct. 1011 (2000).
6 509 U.S. at 589.
7 Id. at 590.
8id.
9 526 U.S. at 147.
2000
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trial "judge must determine whether the testimony has 'a reliable
basis in the knowledge and experience of [the relevant]
discipline.' 10 Thus, Kumho expanded the gatekeeper function to
encompass at least all scientific and technical expert testimony
offered under Rule 702. Additionally, Kumho clarified that in
exercising the gatekeeper function, the trial judge must analyze not
only the general reliability of an expert's methodology but also the
application of that methodology to the specific issue and facts of
the case at bar."
Joiner specified an "abuse of discretion" standard for
appellate courts to apply in reviewing the trial judge's performance
of the gatekeeper function.' 2  Weisgram further strengthened the
authority of both appellate and trial judges to terminate litigation
(rather than authorizing a new trial) where essential expert
testimony was found to have been erroneously admitted.13 In this
context, the trial court's discretion includes "broad latitude when it
decides how to determine reliability,"' 14 but it "is not discretion to
abandon the gatekeeping function" and "it is not discretion to
perform the function inadequately."' 5 Neither "the difficulty of the
task nor any comparative lack of expertise can excuse the
'gatekeeping' duties that the Federal Rules of Evidence impose."',6
The Supreme Court has stressed that "judges have
increasingly found in the Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure
526 U.S. at 149, quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
t The "issue before the court" is not the "reasonableness in general of' an
"expert's use" of a given methodology; rather it is "the reasonableness of using
such an approach," along with the expert's "particular method of analyzing the
data thereby obtained to draw a conclusion regarding the particular matter to
which the expert testimony was directly relevant." 526 U.S. at 153-54.
12 522 U.S. at 143.
13 Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, made unmistakably clear
that a Court of Appeals "may instruct the entry of judgment as a matter of law
for defendant" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50. The Court rejected the
plaintiff's contention that when expert testimony is "excised" on appeal for
failure to meet the Daubert reliability standards, the appellate tribunal must
"remand the case, leaving to the district court's discretion the choice between
final judgment for defendant or a new trial of the plaintiff's case." 528 U.S. at
443.
14 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 142.
1" 526 U.S. at 158-59 (Justice Scalia, concurring).
16 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 148 (Justice Breyer, concurring).
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ways to help thera overcome the inherent difficulty of making
determinations about complicated scientific or otherwise technical
evidence." 17 On review, the appellate court's role is to examine
the trial court's analysis and determine whether the assessments of
relevance and reliability were conducted adequately. This includes
examination of the trial judge's evaluation of whether there is "too
great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion
proffered."' 8  That process requires the appellate court itself to
become substantially immersed in the application of the particular
discipline of the proposed expert to the facts and theories
incorporated in the specific opinion offered.19
The long-term institutional impact of these Supreme Court
decisions has been further strengthened by the adoption of
amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 codifying the Court-
defined rules requiring that expert evidence be found relevant and
reliable before it may be used by the factfinder. These
amendments were approved by the Judicial Conference's Advisory
Committee on Evidence Rules in May, 1999,20 by the Judicial
Conference in September, 1999,21 and by the Supreme Court on
April 17, 2000.22 Following the period allowed for review by
Congress, which ran without legislative intervention, these
amendments became effective on December 1, 2000.23 Thus, the
17 Id. at 149. Examples of these techniques include "an increased use of Rule
16's pretrial conference authority to narrow the scientific issues in dispute,
pretrial hearings where potential experts are subject to examination by the court,
and the appointment of special masters and specially trained law clerks." Id.
18 522 U.S. at 146.
19 Justice Breyer's example of such a review in Kumho, which involved opinions
on the cause of an automobile tire blow out, even included a cutaway drawing of
a tire to illustrate "Radial-Ply Tire Construction." 526 U.S. at 143.
20 Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules to the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure at 5-7 (May 1, 1999).
21 "Judicial Conference Proposes Changes to Rules of Evidence," BNA Criminal
Law Reporter 612 (September 22, 1999).
22 68 U.S.L.W. 4303 (Apr. 25, 2000).
23 As amended by the: addition of the underlined language, the Rule reads as
follows:
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
2000
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principle that expert scientific and technical information not shown
to be relevant and reliable must be excluded from the decisional
process has been endorsed by the Supreme Court, as well as the
Congress.24 That principle fairly may be described as fundamental
to the concept of due process in government actions affecting
liberty and property interests.25
B. The Daubert Process - Transcending Rule 702 's Limits
The Supreme Court developed the Daubert principles in
interpreting and amending Rule 702, a rule governing the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness
has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
24 Even prior to these recent actions, a number of courts had read Daubert and
Joiner to require a vigorous approach to assessing the reliability of opinions in a
number of different litigation contexts. See e.g., Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v
American Simmental Assoc., 178 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 1999) (agricultural
economist's expert opinion excluded); Target Market Publishing, Inc. v ADVO,
Inc., 136 F.3d 1139 (7th Cir. 1998) (business appraiser's lost profits opinion
excluded); U.S. v. $141,700 in U.S. Currency, 157 F.3d 600 (8th Cir. 1998)
(chemist's opinion based on drug testing residue on currency excluded); Bums
Philip Food, Inc. v. Cavalea Continental Freight, Inc., 135 F.3d 526 (7th Cir.
1998) (environmental consultant's land runoff opinion excluded); Black v. Food
Lion, 171 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1999) (opinion on fibromyalgia excluded);
Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Corp. v. Benfield, 140 F. 3d 915 (11th Cir. 1998)
(opinion of arson expert excluded); Kirsten v. Parks Corp., 159 F. 3d 1065 (7th
Cir. 1998) (opinion of industrial safety expert excluded for doing no testing on
the products at issue); Ancho v. Pentek Corp., 157 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 1998)
(mechanical engineer's opinion on design of factory excluded); Tanner v.
Westbrook, 174 F.3d 128 (5th Cir. 1999) (neonatology expert's opinion on birth
asphyxia/cerebral palsy excluded); Robertson v. Norton Co., 148 F.3d 905 (8th
Cir. 1998) (product warnings expert excluded); Ruffin v. Shaw Industries, 149
F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 1998) (opinion on toxic exposure to carpet chemicals
excluded); Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998)
(clinical medicine expert's opinion on toxic fume exposure and reactive airway
disease excluded); Huey v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 165 F.3d 1084 (7th Cir.
1999) (vocational expert's opinion on retaliatory discharge excluded).
25 The probable enduring nature of the Daubert process is signaled by the fact
that there is a broad supporting consensus within the Supreme Court that cuts
across the ideological lines that produce close, bitterly divided decisions in
certain other areas. Thus, Daubert was a 7-2 decision, Joiner 8-1, Kumho 8-1,
and Weisgram 9-0. The Justices who authored the opinion of the Court in these
cases represented a range of judicial philosophies: Blackmun (Daubert),
Rehnquist (Joiner), Breyer (Kumho), and Ginsburg (Weisgram).
[Vol 17302
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admission of expert evidence at trial. For that reason, the full
scope of the Daubert transformation, which goes far beyond
refining an evidence-admissibility rule, is not always appreciated
fully. The Daubert paradigm involves both fundamental changes
in the decisional process and the role of judges in dealing with
expert scientific and technical evidence or decisions that turn on
such evidence. Daubert requires judges to understand and to
explain both the general discipline involved and the logic of the
particular expert opinion that is offered. Judges at all levels must
now become immersed in, and appropriately conversant with, the
wide range of scientific, technical or other types of specialized
knowledge arising in a wide variety of cases. No longer may a
federal judge simply "defer" to a proposed expert on the ground
that he or she has good credentials in a field that is unusual or
difficult.
An equally important change in the judicial process
involves creation and use of a record relating to expert testimony.
The parties and the trial court have duties to create a record
showing the bases and logic of the expert opinion offered, as well
as the reasoning that is found to support the opinion's admission or
exclusion.26  District Judges increasingly have concluded that
preparing a Rule 702 record that can withstand judicial review
requires preparation of a written opinion that includes a statement
of specific findings, 27 and recent appellate decisions support that
view. 28 As required by Joiner and Weisgram, appellate courts
must analyze the record relied on to conclude that expert evidence
26 On the case-management implications of the Daubert process, see Paul S.
Miller et al., Weisgram v. Marley Co.: Strengthened Powers and Duties in
Gatekeeping under Daubert, 2 Science in the Courtroom Review 1, 11-18
(2000).
27 See, e.g., Hon. Janice Kessler (U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia), "View from the Bench: One Federal Judge's Approach to Daubert
issues," presented as part of the D.C. Bar Continuing Legal Education program
entitled, "Expert Witnesses in Federal Court: Kumho Tire in the Next
Millennium," Oct. 4, 1999.
28 Goebel v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 215 F.3d
1083, 1088 (10' Cir. 2000) (We "specifically hold that a district court when
faced with a party's objection, must adequately demonstrate by specific findings
on the record that it has performed its duty as gatekeeper.").
2000
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is (or is not) relevant and reliable, in the manner illustrated by
Justice Breyer's Kumho opinion.29
In summary, the Daubert/Kumho mandate requires judges
preparing civil or criminal cases for trial to assess the relevance
and reliability of expert evidence by personally evaluating the
bases and logic of each opinion and creating a record that will
permit reviewing courts meaningfully to evaluate that decisional
process. While the Daubert process is relatively new - the
Supreme Court's key decision in Kumho was announced in March,
199930 - it may fairly be anticipated that federal judges will
increasingly become skilled "gatekeepers" both in developing and
analyzing a Daubert record.
As federal judges become fully acclimated to the Daubert
process, 31 they understandably will be driven to question why
those same principles of relevance and reliability should not apply
29 See part III of the opinion, 526 U.S. at 153-158.
30 Prior to Kumho, development of the Daubert process was hindered by
conflicts among the circuits as to the scope of opinion covered by Daubert and
Joiner. Specifically, the Second, Ninth and Tenth Circuits had taken the
position that the Daubert decision was inapplicable altogether to admissibility
decisions on non-science expert opinions. (See, e.g., Iacobellii Construction,
Inc. v County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 1994); McKendall v. Crown
Control Corp., 122 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1997); Compton v. Subaruu of America,
Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. Denied, 519 U.S. 1042, 117 S. Ct. 611
(1996)). The First, Fourth and Eleventh (where Kumho arose) Circuits
developed some gatekeeper role for non-science opinions, but it was not the
same as the role described by Daubert (See, e.g., Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of
North America, Inc., 104 F.3d (1st Cir. 1997); Talkington v. Atria
Reclamelucifers Fabrieken BV (Cricket BV), 152 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1998);
Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997)). The Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits tended to apply Daubert to all expert
testimony and their reliability doctrines would have more current validity. (See,
e.g., Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 1121 F.3d 984 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Jones, 107 F.2d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997); Deimer v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Products,
Inc., 58 F.3d 341 (7th Cir. 1995); Pestel v. Vermeer Manufacturing Co., 64 F.3d
382 (8th Cir. 1995)).
3 Further support for recognizing the general applicability of the Daubert
principles may arise from state court practice. The state court systems of a
majority of states have adopted a copy of Rule 702 or have adopted doctrines
similar to the Daubert relevance and reliability doctrines through interpreting
their somewhat different rules governing expert opinion testimony. See Sorett,
"Junk Science in the States -- The Battle Lines," 2 Science in the Courtroom
Review 29 (2000).
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to the use of expert materials in agency rulemaking and other
administrative actions that are not governed by the Federal Rules
of Evidence.32  Although the Supreme Court's Daubert-line
opinions reason in terms of the language of Rule 702, the principle
that "subjective belief or unsupported speculation" is not an
appropriate basis fbr government decisionmaking has been broadly
recognized, including at the constitutional Due Process level.33
Consequently, 'where agency rulemaking or similar
decisionmaking purports to be based on scientific, technical or
other specialized information, Daubert-trained judges instinctively
and appropriately will recognize that the scientific or technical
expertise relied upon by agencies ought not to be mere speculation
or subjective belif. Thus, we anticipate increasingly frequent
32 The thesis developed here is not that administrative agencies should be
required to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence in general. Indeed, such a
requirement clearly would be counterproductive in many scenarios. 2 Kenneth
Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 10.1, p. 117
(3d ed. 1994). What we do contend is that the Daubert process should be
applied generally by administrative agencies, notwithstanding the fact that this
p3rocess was developed through cases construing FRE 702.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of New Jersey, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 113
F.Supp.2d 345, 375 (E.D.NY 2000) ("the use of statistical evidence (subject to
satisfaction of the Daubert criteria) ... does not violate due process strictures");
United States v. Perrone, 936 F.2d 1403, 1419 (2d Cir. 1991) (using facts about
quantity of drug production premised on "speculation violates the commitment
to due process where, as here, difference in quantity can have enormous impact
on the sentence to be imposed.")
34 Imposing the Daubert principles on agency decisionmaking also has found
support in legal literature. See, e.g., Charles D. Weller & David B. Graham,
New Approaches to Environmental Law and Agency Regulation.: The Daubert
Litigation Approach, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. 10557 (July 2000) ("As a matter of
policy and statutory interpretation, the Daubert reliability standard should apply
to federal environmental agencies in rulemaking and adjudication."); D.
HiepTruong, Daubert and Judicial Review. How Does an Administrative
Agency Distinguish Valid Science from Junk Science?, 33 Akron L. Rev. 365
(2000) ("by using Daubert standards, the Court is not second-guessing the
agency's decisionmaking, but is simply ensuring ... that the evidence relied
upon by the agency meets the same threshold requirements that a federal litigant
is already subjected to."); Andrew Trask, Daubert and the EPA.: An Evidentiary
Approach To Reviewing Agency Determinations of Risk, 1997 U. Chi. Legal F.
569 (1997) ("Applying the Daubert gatekeeping function thereby allows courts
to check the validity of the agency's reasoning while maintaining the proper
amount of deference to the agency's rulemaking and adjudicative powers.");
2000 305
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use of the Daubert principle in reviewing agency action,
particularly if counsel are alert to this opportunity. In fact, the
beginning of such a trend has become visible.
III. Courts Are Beginning To "Daubertize" Review Of
Agency Action
There are many categories of agency action, ranging from
individual adjudications that are very much like civil litigation to
notice and comment rulemakings that can be almost legislative in
breadth. We see no reason why "junk science" or unreliable
technical information should provide legally adequate support for
an agency's decision in any type of administrative action, and
recent decisions show increasing judicial support for that position.
A. The Daubert Process Applied To Benefits Adjudication.
Some of what agencies do is "adjudicative" in nature, such
as determining whether an individual claim for benefits under the
federal Black Lung Benefits Act warrants payment. Black lung
contested claims are heard and resolved in the first instance by an
Administrative Law Judge ("AL"), subject to review by the
Benefits Review Board and then by the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
The courts have found no difficulty in requiring that opinions of
experts on cause of death in black lung adjudications be subjected
to the Daubert process, as illustrated by the Court of Appeals
decision in United States Steel Mining Co. v. Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs, US. Department of Labor.
The Fourth Circuit, in discussing the review process, first
explained that the governing provision of the Administrative
Mary Christina Wood, Reclaiming the Natural Rivers: The Endangered Species
Act as Applied to Endangered River Ecosystems, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 197, 259-262
(Spring 1998) (arguing that "Daubert has, albeit indirectly, deflated the driving
rationale behind agency deference" because in a post-Daubert world judges
have to make decisions about scientific evidence through admissibility
atekeeping).
187 F. 3d 384, 390 (4th Cir. 1999) (reversing award where the "only evidence
in the record [on causation] is Dr. Rasmussen's speculative statement").
[Vol 17306
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Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d), makes the exclusion required by
FRD 702 inapplicable and requires a Daubert adaptation:
Section 556(d) of the Act recognizes the reality that
rigorous exclusionary rules for the admission of evidence make
little sense in heaings before an administrative agency where the
ALJ acts as both judge and factfinder. When the judge is also
factfinder, he is equally exposed to evidence whether he admits it
or excludes it.
In that context, the courts have required the ALJ to admit
"all relevant evidence, erring on the side of inclusion."3 6 The
gatekeeping begins after admission, as explained in U.S. Steel
Mining Co.:
But even though the more stringent exclusionary rules of
evidence, which are generally applicable to jury trials, are not
justified in agency proceedings, the agency process nonetheless
requires that the ALJ perform a gate keeping function while
assessing evidence to decide the merits of a claim. To assure both
fairness in the process and an outcome consistent with the
underlying statutory scheme, the ALJ has, under § 556(d) of the
Administrative Procedure Act, the affirmative duty to qualify
evidence as "reliable, probative, and substantial" before relying
upon it to grant or deny a claim.37
Thus, the Daubert process becomes decisional rather than
focused on admissibility. As summarized by the Fourth Circuit:
in an agency proceeding the gate keeping function
to evaluate evidence occurs when the evidence is
considered in decisionmaking rather than when the
evidence is admitted. Even though it arises later in
the administrative process than it does in jury trials,
the ALJ's duty. to screen evidence for reliability,
probativeness, and substantiality similarly ensures
that final agency decisions will be based on
evidence of requisite quality and quantity.3"
In short, the U.S. Steel Mining Court made unmistakably
clear that the agency factfinder has a duty to "screen evidence for
36 Underwood v. EMay Mining, Inc., 105 F. 3d 946, 951 (4th Cir. 1997).
37 187 F.3d at 388-89.
3 Id. at 389.
2000
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reliability" to ensure that the final agency decision is "based on
evidence of requisite quality and quantity" and that a reviewing
court must enforce that duty.
B. Tariff Classification And Other Agency Actions
Scrutinized Using Daubert Principles
The utility of applying Daubert principles in review of
agency action also is exemplified by the import tariff classification
decision in Libas, Ltd. v. United States.39 Libas sought to import
fabric into the United States under the tariff rules applicable to
"hand-loomed" fabric, but the U.S. Customs Service classified the
fabric as "power-loomed" based on "a new test developed by the
Los Angeles Customs Laboratory., 40 The result was to subject the
fabric to a higher tariff rate and a quota. Libas sought review of
the classification before the Court of International Trade, which
affirmed based on the results of the Customs test.4 1 On appeal to
the Federal Circuit, Libas contended that the trial court erred
"because the methodology involved in the Customs test was not
shown to be reliable or properly validated by scientific or other
,,42appropriate technical means, relying on Daubert and Kumho.
The Federal Circuit properly first acknowledged that
"Daubert and Kumho were decided in the context of determining
standards for the admissibility of expert testimony under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which are not at issue here, ' 43 because
the Customs test was not "admitted" but, instead, was "part of the
record" supporting the Customs determination that was transferred
to the Court of International Trade pursuant to the statutory
procedure governing judicial review. The Federal Circuit,
nevertheless, recognized the importance of Daubert and Kumho,
reasoning as follows:
45
31 193 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
40 193 F.3d at 1363.
41 Libas Ltd. v. U.S., 944 F. Supp. 938 (1996).
42 193 F.3d at 1365.
431 Id. at 1366 n.2.
44 Id. at 1366.45Id. at 1366.
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We agree with Libas, however, that the proposition for
which they stand, that expert testimony must be reliable, goes to
the weight that evidence is to be accorded as well as to its
admissibility. Neither the plain language of the relevant Supreme
Court opinions nor the underlying principles requiring reliability
for expert testimony are narrowly confined in application to
questions of admissibility.
Consequently, the Federal Circuit, as contemplated by
Joiner, went on to scrutinize the administrative record, seeking
evidence establishing that the Customs test was valid, and focused
its analysis on the four factors related to reliability identified in
Daubert.46
The Court of Appeals found that "the Customs test fails to
satisfy any of [the Daubert] factors except - possibly - general
acceptance, and it offers no other assurances of reliability based on
factors not mentioned in Daubert to make up for those defects."
47
The Court concluded, "therefore, it was clearly erroneous for the
trial court to credit the testimony of Customs' witnesses that the
test could distinguish between power-loomed and hand-loomed
fabric. ' '48 It then remanded the case to the Court of International
Trade "for furtheir findings because the trial court was not on
notice that in circumstances like those presented here, it was
obliged to make an assessment of reliability based on the sort of
analysis we have described." 49
Following remand, the Court of International Trade
"conducted a hearing to assess the reliability of Customs' test" 50
and found, based on analysis of the resulting record, that Customs
"failed to establiSh that its test satisfied any of the Daubert
46 As described by the Federal Circuit:
The Supreme Court, in Daubert, cited four such factors: (1) the testability of the
hypothesis; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review
and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether the
technique is generally accepted. 509 U.S. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786.
193 F. 3d at 1366-67.
" 193 F.3d at 1369.
48 Id.
49 Id. Libas was decided before Weisgram,which made clear that where there has
been fair notice, the Court of Appeals properly may terminate the litigation by
order favorable to the party not relying on the unreliable expert proof.5 0 Libas Ltd. v. U.S., 118 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1235 (Ct. Int. Trade 2000).
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standards cited by the Federal Circuit" or "any other indicia of
reliability."'" The Court then concluded that, without reliable
evidence, Customs "fails to prove that the fabric at issue was
power-loomed,, 52 and ordered the fabric reclassified as hand-
loomed.53
Libas is the first, but not the only, decision in which a
reviewing court has applied Daubert scrutiny to an agency action
other than formal adjudication.5 4 This emerging jurisprudence also
stands in stark contrast to the plea for expert deference generally
advanced by the government in cases involving review of agency
scientific and technical decisions. As set forth by the Justice
Department in a recent FDA review case:
Courts "review scientific judgments of the agency 'not as
the chemist, biologist, or statistician that we are qualified neither
by training nor experience to be, but as a reviewing court
exercising our narrowly defined duty of holding agencies to certain
minimal standards of rationality.' "Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120
F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting in part Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). See also New York v.
Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 5
5' Id. Both the Court of Appeals and the Court of International Trade clearly
were troubled by the failure of Customs to attempt to validate its test by running
the test in circumstances where a number of pieces of fabric actually known to
be hand-loomed or power-loomed were tested by testers who did not know in
advance whether the tested samples were hand-loomed or power-loomed.
52 118 F. Supp. 2dat 1237.
531Id. at 1238.
54 The Libas treatment of Daubert doctrines has been endorsed by other
appellate courts. Elliott v. CTFC, 202 F.3d 926, 934 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Daubert
and Kumho were decided in the context of admissibility, but the principle for
which they stand - that all expert testimony must be reliable - should apply with
equal force to the weight a factfimder accords expert testimony"); Rucker v.
Brown, 10 Vet.App.67, 73 (Ct. Vet. App. 1997) (In Veterans Appeal Board
Action on benefits claims, "reference to the criteria found in Daubert ... would
more thoroughly elucidate the necessary 'reason and bases' for the Board's
decision").
5s Brief for Appellees Donna E. Shalala, et al. in Pfizer Inc. v. Donna E. Shalala,
D.C. Cir. No. 98-5151, filed Nov. 4, 1998, at 17-18. The quoted language from
Troy was dictum related to an issue of construing ambiguous statutory language
(governed by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837 (1984)), where the Court of Appeals "would have to conclude that
[EPA's] interpretation either ran athwart a clear mandate of Congress, or was an
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We would hope that the government would rethink this
position in light of Daubert and accelerate the Libas trend, but
revision may be a slow process absent Presidential direction. In
addition, judicial review of agency action takes place under a
variety of statutory provisions, as well as the Administrative
Procedure Act, and a comprehensive Daubert review jurisprudence
will take years to develop. Finally, as we now discuss, the courts
have not yet come to grips with the application of Daubert
principles to informal rulemaking.
IV. The Daubert Process Properly Applies To Agency
Rulemaking
We have found no case applying Daubert/Kumho
principles to the review of a regulation arising from informal
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act. We believe
that void partly reflects that novelty of the Daubert process and
partly the fact that neither agencies nor advocates have had time to
digest fully its relevant implications.
A. The Nature And Uses Of informal Rulemaking
Health and safety agencies generally use informal
rulemaking as a vehicle for promulgating regulations incorporating
scientific and technical conclusions. In informal notice and
comment rulemaking, the agency publishes notice of a proposed
rulemaking in the Federal Register, after which interested persons
have a fixed period of time (specified by each agency or by
executive order) to make submissions concerning the proposed
rule.56  After the comment period expires, the agency must
consider the public comments before promulgating a final rule. In
unreasonable one." 120 F.3d at 284. When it came to considering EPA's
classification of specific chemicals, the Court scrutinized very carefully what
EPA had done, and where the Court found inconsistencies, it vacated the EPA
action, stating that absent "further explanation of its different approaches in the
two cases, the agency has acted arbitrarily and capriciously in listing Bronopol
as a chronic toxicant." 120 F.3d at 291.56 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. '§ 553 (2000).
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their final rulemaking decisions, agencies are required to explain
the basis and purpose of their actions including the scientific and
technical analyses which support them.
57
Examples of informal rulemakings include the EPA's
issuance of air quality standards under the Clean Air Act 58 and
CPSC requirements for child resistant packaging under the Poison
Prevention Packaging Act.59 In addition, OSHA promulgates
workplace safety and health regulations using an informal notice
and comment procedure. 60 Even where a health and safety agency
such as FDA focuses on a specific type of product (e.g., breast
implants), it is likely to employ an informal process rather than a
formal adjudicatory proceeding.6 1
Under informal rulemaking procedures, agencies typically
do not develop a controlled administrative record equivalent to the
record that would be produced in a trial court.62 Unlike judicial
fora which are responding to cases initiated by public or private
parties, agencies are most often the initiators of the regulatory
proceedings on which scientific and technical analysis is brought
to bear.63 Agencies initiate these proceedings with proposals based
17 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000) ("After consideration of the relevant matter
presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise statement
of their basis and purpose.").
5 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) (2000).
'9 15 U.S.C. § 1471-1476 (2000).60 However, the OSH Act sets forth a procedure that provides an opportunity for
a public hearing in some circumstances. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(2)-(4) (2000).
61 E.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b) (2000)
(provides informal procedure when FDA issues regulations requiring pre-market
approval of medical devices); Silicone Gel-filled Breast Prosthesis, 21 C.F.R.
§ 878.3540 (Apr. 10, 1991) (regulation requiring pre-market approval of breast
implants).
62 Agencies vary in the extent to which they develop their administrative records
in informal rulemakings. CPSC is mandated by the Consumer Product Safety
Act to include certain items. 15 U.S.C. § 2060 (2000) ("For purposes of this
section, the term 'record' means such consumer product safety rule; any notice
or proposal published pursuant to section 2056, 2057, or 2058 of this title; the
transcript required by section 2058(d)(2) of this title of any oral presentation;
any written submission of interested parties; and any other information which
the Commission considers relevant to such rule.").
63 See, e.g., Household Products Containing Hydrocarbons, 65 Fed. Reg. 93
(Notice of proposed rulemaking) (Jan. 3, 2000) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt.
1700) (CPSC initiated proposal to request information and comments about a
16
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on their own evaluations and may or may not disclose in a
complete or timely manner the scientific and technical materials
upon which they rely or the analytical process they follow.
Moreover, the Administrative Procedure Act permits public
participation in the rulemaking process without regard to the
quality of public submissions. Thus, the agency record may
provide little useful guidance on the scientific and technical
materials or conclusions relied upon by the agency to reach the
rulemaking conclusions.
B. The Daubert Principles - A Natural Fit Within The
Typical Standard For Judicial Review Of Agency
Action
The first line of defense against allowing this amorphous
process to open the door to agency reliance on bad science or
misleading technical assessments is for advocates to invoke
Daubert principles in rulemaking and to vigorously challenge
scientific and technical submissions which are not relevant and
reliable. In litigation, failure timely to raise issues of Daubert
relevance and reliability can waive the right to challenge." Waiver
rule which would require child-resistant packaging for consumer products
containing low viscosity hydrocarbons); NMFS, Commerce Secretary Mineta
Acts to Protect Horseshoe Crabs, Press Release NOAA 2000-149 (Oct. 12,
2000) available at
<http://www.publicaffairs.noaa.gov/releases2000/oct0O/noaaOOrl49.html > as of
Jan. 12, 2001; NMFS, NOAA Fisheries Closes Area on the Grand Banks to
Longline Fishermen under Emergency Rule to Protect Sea Turtles, Press
Release NOAA 2000-148 (Oct. 6, 2000) available at <
http://www.publicaffctirs.noaa.gov/releases2000/octOO/noaaOOr148.html > as of
Jan. 13, 2001.
64 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000) ("[T]he agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rule making through the submission of written
data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.").65 Mascenti v. Becker, 237 F.3d 1223, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2001) ("Daubert does
not mandate an inquiry questioning and challenging the scientific proffer absent
a timely request by an objecting party.") A "decision to admit expert opinion
evidence will be reviewed only for plain error when objections under
Daubert/Kumho are not timely made." Id. at 1232. Where a timely objection is
made, the decision on admission is reviewed for "abuse of discretion," as
specified in Joiner and illustrated in Kumho.
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in the absence of objection was proper in those circumstances,
because the party tendering the evidence was "deprived of the
opportunity to offer other supporting proof' and the "trial judge
was disadvantaged in that she was not alerted to the need of stating
Daubert/Kumho findings and analysis." 66 While waiver may not
apply directly in agency rulemaking, pre-comment disclosures by
the agency of critical scientific/technical premises which can then
be addressed in comments or opportunities for reply comment call
for a targeted challenge to materials that could not be relied upon
in a court proceeding. That substantive challenge would advisedly
be coupled with a demand for particularized agency findings and
any special procedures, (e.g., supplemental scientific/technical
comments or informal oral hearings) necessary to resolve the
relevance and reliability issues. By laying this foundation,
advocates can prompt reviewing courts to give agency scientific
evidence decisions the close scrutiny they deserve.
1. Reliance On "Speculation" - A Violation Of Settled
Review Standards
The standards used by courts in reviewing the results of
informal agency rulemaking combine the particular requirements
of the statute authorizing agency action,67 the general standards set
forth in the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") (unless
displaced by the enabling statute), and Constitutional limitations
on the underlying legislative power. While statutory specific
standards are not uncommon, certain general principles are almost
universally applicable. Thus, under the terms of the APA, a
reviewing court may set aside a regulation issued through informal
rulemaking when it is determined to be "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 68 If
66 Id. at 1234.
67 Merely as one illustration, the Safe Drinking Water Act, as amended in 1996,
provides that "to the degree that an Agency action is based on science, the
Administrator shall use ... the best available, peer-reviewed science and
supporting studies conducted in accordance with sound and objective scientific
practices." Section 300g-l(b)(3)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(3)(A)(2000).
68 This four-part standard often is referred to as the "arbitrary and capricious"
test. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 822 F.2d 277, 280
(2d Cir. 1987).
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the agency's decision rests on factual premises, its "factual
findings must be supported by substantial evidence." 69
The Daubert principles of relevance and reliability are
clearly compatible with these standards of review. If a court bound
by Daubert erroneously allows consideration of excludable expert
evidence, a reviewing court may set aside its verdict as an "abuse
of discretion" under Joiner. If an agency bases a rulemaking
decision on irrelevant or unreliable expert evidence, that reliance is
an equally fundamental "abuse of discretion" under the APA and
should require the agency's action to be set aside and remanded for
further determination on a reliable record.
The "substantial" evidence requirement applicable to an
agency's factual findings has both quantitative and qualitative
dimensions which support this conclusion. Quantitatively,
substantial evidence "has been construed to mean less than a
preponderance, but more than a scintilla' 70 Thus, there must be
some probative evidence in the agency record to support its
findings. Specifically, there must be "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." 71 Daubert and its progeny, as encapsulated in new
Rule 702, teach that for expert evidence to be adequate to support a
decision, it must be "knowledge," as distinguished from mere
"speculation." The Daubert logic thus fits readily into the
substantial evidence test. If an expert opinion is not shown to be
both relevant and reliable, then it has not been shown to be more
than speculation. As described by one Court of Appeals,
"speculation is, of course, no substitute for evidence, and a
decision based on speculation is not supported by substantial
evidence., 72 Thus, were an agency to premise a rule solely on
unreliable scientific or technical information, i.e. on speculation, a
reviewing court has ample APA authority to vacate and remand it
that rule.
69 Cellular Phone TaskfForce v. FCC, 205 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2000).
70 Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1999).
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (internal
% uotation marks omitted).
White Ex Rel. Smith v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 369, 375 (7th Cir. 1999) (reversing
Social Security Administration's denial of benefits).
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2. Courts Are Already Applying A Daubert Review
Model Implicitly
Although it lacks an express reference to Daubert
standards, the recent District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
decision in Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC,73 is an example of
judicial review of agency reliance on expert evidence in
rulemaking that implicitly invokes the Daubert principles under
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. That case
involved review by the D.C. Circuit of Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") amendments to guidelines required under
the National Environmental Policy Act.74  Those guidelines
specified levels of maximum permitted exposure to radio
frequency radiation from facilities such as radio broadcast antennas
or cellular phone towers. Where exposure would not exceed the
guidelines, then the FCC would license without an environmental
assessment and would preempt state authorities from regulating the
operation of such facilities based on RF emissions.75
The health and safety issues involved in setting such radio
frequency maximum exposure guidelines were outside the FCC's
expertise. Thus, in reaching its decision, the FCC was required to
rely on expert communications from other sources including the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"), the National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health ("NIOSH"), the Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA") and standards setting bodies such as
the American National Standards Institute ("ANSr), 76 the
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements
("NCRP"), and the International Radiation Protection
Association.77
" 205 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
74 42 U.S.C. § § 4321 et seq. (2000).
75 Guidelines for Evaluating the Environmental Effects of Radio frequency
Radiation, 11 F.C.C. Red. 15123, 1996 WL 926565 (1996); Procedures for
Reviewing Requests for Relief from State and Local Regulations Pursuant to
Section 332(c)(7)(B)(v) of the Communications Act of 1934, 12 F.C.C. Rcd.
13494, 1997 WL 522796 (1997).
76 In this area, ANSI standards reflect the standards development work of the
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineering. 205 F.3d at 88 n.1.
77 205 F.3d at 88.
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The issues in the rulemaking included whether the
maximum permitted exposure standards properly could be based
solely on the capacity of radio frequency radiation to cause tissue
warming (referred to as "thermal effects") or whether they should
be based on some lower exposure ceiling that would protect
against alleged "'non-thermal effects," most notably cancer. 7' The
FCC's final guidelines, which "combined the NCRP standard with
the ANSI standard,, 79 reflected only that radio frequency
"radiation at excessive levels has thermal effects." 80 Petitioners'
challenge was that the "Guidelines are arbitrary and capricious
because they fail to account for non-thermal effects of RF
radiation," in that "neither the ANSI nor the NCRP sufficiently
considered evidence of non-thermal effects."
81
The Court of Appeals, responding to the petitioners'
argument, noted that when "an agency makes a decision in the face
of disputed technical facts, '[a] court must be reluctant to reverse
results supported by ... the weight of considered and carefully
articulated expert opinion."' 2  The court's reference to
"considered and carefully articulated expert opinion" resonates the
Daubert requirement that reviewing courts ensure decisions are
based on reliable scientific evidence. Additionally, the Court
stated that it "must be satisfied that the agency examined the
relevant data and established a 'rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made'."8 3 This standard is analogous to
the Joiner relevance requirement that even reliable scientific
evidence can sustain a result only if there is no "analytical gap"
between its conclusions and the issues to be resolved by the trier of
fact.
The record before the Court of Appeals showed that "ANSI
found that 'no reliable scientific data exist indicating that
78 See generally, Bruce L. McDonald, "FCC's Rulemaking Focuses On Issues
Important To Litigation," Andrews Electromagnetic Field Litigation Reporter at
16-28 (April, 1994).
79 205 F.3d at 88.
'
0 Id. at 90.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 89. (quoting Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power & Light Co.,
404 U.S. 453, 463 (1972)).
83 Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm
Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29,43 (1983).
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[n]onthermal exposure may be meaningfully related to human
health"' and that "NCRP found that the existence of non-thermal
effects is 'clouded by a host of conflicting reports and opinions'. 84
The record further showed that "the expert agencies consulted" by
the FCC (i.e., FDA, EPA, OSHA and NIOSH) each "had been
advised of such evidence of non-thermal health effects as may
have existed and still found the FCC's approach to be
satisfactory., 85 The Court also stressed that the "FCC satisfied
itself that there was a mechanism in place for accommodating
changes in scientific knowledge" within ANSI and NCRP, together
with an FCC commitment to "consider amending [its] rules at any
appropriate time- if these groups conclude that such action is
desirable."
86
The Court of Appeals held that, where there were "no
reliable scientific data" establishing the existence of non-thermal
effects and when the agency's process accommodated" future
"changes in scientific knowledge," the FCC's refusal to base its
Guideline on non-thermal effects "was not arbitrary and
capricious." 87 The Court's decision carried with it the implicit
caution that if the agency had based its decision on unreliable
science or had failed to establish a mechanism to accommodate
future changes in knowledge that might invalidate the scientific
basis of the rule, then the Court would have vacated the rule. An
express application of Daubert principles, in our view, would have
supported the same result.
C. Daubert Review Of Administrative Agency Actions -
Consistent With "Chevron Deference"
The Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council,88 is frequently cited as
establishing a "principle of deference to administrative
interpretations." Properly understood, however, that deference
applies only to legal interpretations reflecting policy/political
84 205 F.3d at 90.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 90-91.
87 Id. at 90.
88467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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judgments delegated to the agencies by the Congress. It does not
create an unreviewable mandate permitting an agency to proceed
on the basis of scientific or technical speculation.
Chevron involved review of an Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") regulation defining the term "stationary source"
for purposes of the federal Clean Air Act. The challenged EPA
regulation embodied a plantwide "stationary source" definition that
would "allow all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same
industrial grouping" to be treated "as though they were encased
within a single 'bubble,"' thus permitting an "existing plant that
contains several pollution-emitting devices [to] install or modify
one piece of equipment" without meeting "several stringent
conditions" that are applicable to permits for "new or modified
major stationary sources," so long as the "alteration will not
increase the total emissions from the plant." 89  The National
Resources Defense 'Council ("NRDC") argued that each pollution-
emitting device was a "stationary source" under the Act and could
be modified only if it individually met the stringent conditions.
The Court of Appeals sided with the NRDC, but the Supreme
Court reversed that decision and reinstated the bubble regulation.
The Court first noted that when "Congress has addressed
the precise question at issue," an agency "must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." 9° In the situation
presented in Chevron, however, where "the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," then "a court may
not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency." 91 This "deference" principle - that the agency to which
Congress has delegated authority, rather than its reviewing court,
has final authority to choose between reasonable alternative
constructions of statutory language - has now become settled
jurisprudence. 92 Nothing in Chevron, however, justifies agencies
89 467 U.S. at 840.
90 467 U.S. at 842-43.
9' 467 U.S. at 844.92 See, e.g., Whitman v. American Trucking Association, 531 U.S. __, Slip. Op.
at 21 (2001) ("if the statute is 'silent or ambiguous' with respect to the issue,
then we must defer to a 'reasonable interpretation of an agency'). A corollary
of the Chevron deference rule is that agencies may change their interpretations
of ambiguous statutory language when a -new political party or philosophy takes
2000
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in taking non-political, fact-based actions premised on speculation.
In that area, Congress has unequivocally vested final arbitrary and
capricious review authority in the courts.
V. The Case For A Daubert Executive Order
We believe that, given sufficient time and effective
advocacy, the courts inevitably will impose Daubert discipline on
the agency process. In the interim, however, agencies may
continue to impose restrictions on personal freedoms and the use of
private property based on scientific or technical information and
conclusions that could not survive review in a federal court. In
addition, agencies will continue to use disparate processes in
evaluating scientific and technical submissions from interested
parties, as well as in regulating review of their internally-generated
scientific and technical premises.
Because of the increasing importance of scientific and
technical issues in health and safety regulation, and the
constitutional due process underpinnings of the Daubert cases, a
compelling case may be made for accelerating and harmonizing
Daubert application through an appropriate Executive Order. We
thus turn to a brief consideration of the role of Executive Orders in
regulating the agency process and discussion of a proposed order
that would establish Daubert both in policy and process.
A. Executive Orders - Appropriate Vehicles For Agency
Guidance
The President's authority to issue Executive Orders is said
to arise in substantial part from Article II, Section 3 of the
Constitution, which provides that the President "shall take care that
control. An agency may, within the limits of a legislative ambiguity, that is, a
Congressional delegation of authority, "properly rely upon the incumbent
administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments." 437 U.S. at 865.
See also, Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186 (1991) ("An agency is not required
to 'establish rules of conduct to last forever,' but rather 'must be given ample
latitude to adapt [its] rules and policies to the demands of changing
circumstances' (quoting Motor Vehicle Mnfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut.
Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)).
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the laws be faithfully executed." Executive Orders first were given
that label by President Lincoln, 93 and first were organized in
numbered sequence by the State Department beginning in 1907.94
They have been used with considerable frequency during the past
30 years, as the size and complexity of government has
increased,95 with the result that almost 13,200 had been issued
96prior to 2001. Some Executive Orders rely solely on
constitutional authority; others are issued pursuant to statute.97
Executive Orders are used for many purposes, including to
delegate authority from the President to department heads, 98 to
create new government organizational entities,99 to guide federal
government agency relations with state governments,100 and to
93 George Washington issued a neutrality proclamation of 1793 directing all U.S.
citizens to refrain from engaging in conduct that could provoke a belligerent
power. Frank B. Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498: A Test Case in
Presidential Control of Executive Agencies, 4 J. Law Pol. 483, 485 (1988).
94 Id. at 486 n. 5. The Executive Orders issued during a given year are published
in Title 3 of the Code of Federal Regulations issued the following year (e.g., the
1999 Orders are in the CFR "Revised as of January 1, 2000") The Code of
Federal Regulations publication is not cumulative; so in order to locate a given
Executive Order, one must find the correct year of Title 3 of CFR. Executive
Orders are also published in the Federal Register, typically several days after
issuance by the President. Executive Orders may be found in the WESTLAW
"PRES" online database.
95 On limits of presidential power under the "take care" clause, see Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (holding that President
Truman lacked authority to seize and operate private property to ensure steel
jroduction).
On Dec. 28, 2000, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13,185 ("To
Strengthen the Federal Government-University Research Partnership"), 66 Fed.
Reg. 701 (Jan. 3, 2001).
97 For example, compare Executive Order 13045 (62 Fed.Reg. 19885, Apr. 23,
1997), which relies only on the "Constitution and the laws of the United States,"
with Executive Order 13132 (64 Fed.Reg. 43225, Aug. 10, 1999) which invokes
the "Unfunded Mandates Reform Act," as well.
98 See, e.g., Executive Order 10250, Delegation of Functions to the Secretary of
the Interior, 16 Fed. Reg. 5385 (June 5, 1951), as amended.
99 See, e.g., Executive Order 13,100, establishing the President's Council on
Food Safety. 3 CFR 209 (1999).
100 For example, President Reagan's Executive Order 12,612 limited federal
agencies from attempting or purporting to preempt state law except where
federal statutes clearly authorized such preemption. 3 CFR 253, 255 (1988).
This Executive Order was revoked by President Clinton's Executive Order
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prescribe rules and procedures so that diverse agency activities can
be coordinated by the President and focused in terms of the
President's priorities.' 0 '
Executive Orders may be directed to all "federal agencies"
and will apply to any entity defined under 44 USC § 3502(1),102
excluding entities considered to be "independent regulatory
agencies" under 44 USC § 3502(5).103 Frequently, however,
Executive Orders include a provision declaring that each
"independent regulatory agency is encouraged to participate in the
13,083, which established different "Federalism" principles and included no
such restriction on agency preemption attempts. 3 CFR 146 (1999).101 See, e.g., Executive Order 13045 (62 Fed. Reg. 19885, Apr. 23, 1997) by
which President Clinton directed agencies to have concern in rulemaking and
other actions involving "a environmental health risk or safety risk that an agency
has reason to believe may disproportionately affect children," and establishing
related procedures.
102 As defined there:
(1) the term "agency" means an executive department, military department,
Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other
establishment in the executive branch of the Government (including the
Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency, but
does not include -
A) the General Accounting Office;
B) Federal Election Commission;
C) the governments of the District of Columbia and of the territories and
possessions of the United States, and their various subdivisions; or
D) Government-owned contractor operated facilities, including laboratories
engaged in national defense research and production activities.
103 As defined there:
(5) the term "independent regulatory agency" means the. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the
Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Federal
Housing Finance Board, the Federal Maritime Commission, the
Federal Trade Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission,
the Mine Enforcement Safety and Health Review Commission, the
National Labor Relations Board, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission, the Postal Rate Commission, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and any other similar agency designated by
statute as a Federal independent regulatory agency or commission.
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implementation of this order and comply with its provisions."',0 4
Thus, an Executive Order implementing Daubert principles could
control most of the major rulemaking agencies and make the
remainder subject to exhortative guidance that could prove highly
influential in judicial review and congressional oversight.
B. Executive Order 12866 - A Bipartisan Foundation For
A Daubert Executive Order.
The proposed Daubert order would fit easily into the
process contemplated by Executive Order 12866, "Regulatory
Planning and Review," issued by President Clinton on September
30, 1993.105 This Executive Order declared that regulations should
be "effective, consistent, sensible, and understandable" and began
"a program to reform and make more efficient the regulatory
process." 10 6  In that context, the Executive Order specifies a
"regulatory philosophy" and states 12 "principles of regulation."
10 7
The Executive Order stresses that, "[b]ecause Federal agencies are
the repositories of significant expertise and experience, they are
responsible for developing regulations and assuring that the
regulations are consistent with the applicable law, the President's
priorities, and the principles set forth in this Executive Order."'
0 8
The Order's principles include that each "agency shall base its
decisions on the best reasonably obtainable scientific, technical,
economic, and other information concerning the need for and
consequences of, the intended regulation."' 0 9 This commitment to
use the best obtainable science and technical information is clearly
compatible with Daubert, although it does leave open the
possibility of proceeding on unreliable information if no better
information is available."1
0
1o See, e.g., subsection 1-102 of Executive Order 13045 (62 Fed.Reg. 19885,
Apr. 23, 1997).
1OP58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct 4, 1993).
106 Executive Order 12866, preamble.
107 Executive Order 12866, at Section 1.
108 Id. at Section 2(a).
109 Id. at Section l(b)(7).
110 Some statutes, fo:r example the Section 300g - l(b)(3)(A) of the Safe
Drinking Water Act, as amended in 1996 following Daubert, provide that "to
the degree that an Agency action is based on science, the Administrator shall use
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Executive Order 12866 also sets out a number of
procedural requirements, many of which permit the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of
Management and Budget to "provide meaningful guidance and
oversight so that the agency's regulatory actions are consistent
with applicable law, the President's priorities, and the principles,"
including the best-science principle. The Executive Order also
directs each agency to "provide the public with meaningful
participation in the regulatory process," and to "afford the public a
meaningful opportunity to comment on any proposed
regulation."' 12
Because Executive Order 12866 was issued just four
months after the Daubert decision was announced, and years
before its meaning was refined and explained in Joiner and
Kumho, it is unlikely that Executive Order 12866 was intended to
impose Daubert standards. However, its compatibility with the
Daubert decision provides a bipartisan basis for more detailed
supplementation. An Executive Order specifying both substantive
standards to satisfy the Daubert requirements and procedural steps
to enforce Daubert analysis would provide a useful and properly
noncontroversial supplement to Executive Order 12866.113
C. Content Of A Daubert Executive Order.
A Daubert Executive Order should establish conclusively
that any scientific and technical information relied upon by
... the best available, peer-reviewed science and supporting studies conducted in
accordance with sound and objective scientific practices." At least one
reviewing court has perceived no difficulty in applying that standard of review
to EPA rulemaking. Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286, 1291
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (EPA failure to act "on the best available evidence, at the time
of the rulemaking" was "arbitrary and capricious and in excess of statutory
authority").
... Id. at Section 6(b).
112 Id. at Section 6(a).
113 It is commonplace for later Executive Orders expressly to supplement earlier
ones. For example, President Clinton's Executive Order 12898 ("Federal
Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-
Income Populations") declared,' "This Executive Order is intended to
supplement but not supersede Executive Order No. 12250." 59 Fed. Reg. 7629,
7632 (Feb. 11, 1994).
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agencies must be evaluated for reliability and relevance on a
reviewable record specifying the scientific and/or technical basis
for the agency's action and explaining the agency's detailed
rationale for finding the relevance and reliability of that
information.
Any agency proceedings forseeably raising scientific or
technical issues should commence with a notice disclosing the
,anticipated issues and the content and source of information on
which the agency intends to rely. Early notice is essential if public
participants and their experts are to have a meaningful opportunity
to address the issues and the reliability of any agency-asserted
information. Disclosure could be made in the Federal Register
publication of a proposed rulemaking or in the "technical support
documents" already used by agencies and made available to the
public on demand.' 14  At least in the case of significant
rulemakings, the agency's scientific and technical analysis, the
factual bases that are key to the analysis, and resulting conclusions
should be disclosed in their entirety.
The initial disclosure by an agency also should include a
discussion of the agency's rationale for determining that any expert
analysis relied on in the proposed action is scientifically or
technically reliable. Testing the reliability of an expert's studies
and opinions is both the heart of the Daubert process and one of its
most complex dimensions. In Daubert itself, which involved
opinions that exposure to the drug Bendectin had caused the
plaintiffs' birth defects,' 15 the Supreme Court did "not presume to
set out a definitive: checklist or text,"'1 6 but identified several
factors thought to be relevant to evaluating scientific reliability:
1 7
a) whether a "theory or technique" "can be (and has
been) tested" to see it if "can be falsified";
b) "whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication";
114 For an example of Technical Support Document use, see the Department of
Energy's notice promulgating "Central Air Conditioners and Heat Pumps
Energy Conservation Standards," 66 Fed.Reg. 7170 (Jan. 22, 2001).
"' 509 U.S. at 582.
116 509 U.S. at 593.
17 509 U.S. at 593-94.
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c) "the known or potential rate or error" and the
"existence and maintenance of standards controlling
the technique's operation"; and
d) "general acceptance," meaning "explicit
identification of a relevant scientific community and
an express determination of a particular degree of
acceptance within that community."
Six years later, when the Supreme Court revisited
reliability issues in Kumho, where the expert was an engineer
specializing in automobile accident reconstruction and the expert
opinion at issue asserted the cause of a tire blow-out, the Court
recognized that different or additional factors were relevant to
determining the reliability of technical information." 8 Thus, what
constitutes a proper showing of the reliability of scientific and
technical information and its proper application in a given
rulemaking will vary widely with the discipline and type of
opinion. While that reality means there is no single formula for
specifying the reliability standard to be used and disclosed, a
general disclosure requirement is essential.
A similar demonstration and disclosures are required for
relevance. In the usual situation, there will be little doubt that
proffered expert evidence is somehow generally relevant. As
illustrated in Joiner, however, there often is an issue about whether
admittedly reliable data or studies go far enough in what they
prove to support the conclusion that an expert proposes to draw
from them, or whether there is an "analytical gap" between the
.18 Justice Bryer's Kumho reliability analysis teaches that types evidence of
unreliability of an expert opinion include implausible inconsistency in the power
of the method, reliance on subjective observations of the expert, casual or
careless gathering of ostensibly key data, inconsistent application or changes in
the method during the same factual assessment, and record-demonstrated data
errors by the expert. In addition, other non-Daubert factors identified by the
parties (or the absence of any), and evidence of use of the methodology of other
experts (or the absence of that), articles or papers that validate the approach (or
the absence of any) and use by the expert of the methodology in non-litigation
business contexts (or the absence of any) all may bear on reliability. 526 U.S. at
154-57.
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supporting data and the proposed scientific or technical
conclusion. 1
9
The Executive Order should make express that the
demonstration and disclosure requirements apply not only when an
agency relies on internal expertise but also when the agency relies
on expert evidence or opinion submitted by others, such as other
agencies or private parties. Agencies should make clear to
commenters that they bear the burden of establishing that proffered
scientific or technical information is relevant and reliable if they
wish it to be considered as "knowledge" rather than "speculation."
Absent such a demonstration, the commenter's information will
remain in the rulemaking record but should be treated as argument.
In court proceedings, the record on reliability and relevance
can be established by depositions and so-called Daubert hearings
where experts can be confronted by counter-experts and cross-
examined under oath.' 20 While the APA does not require agencies
to take these steps, the Executive Order should direct agencies,
where authorized by law, to make available supplementary
proceedings in which the agency on request or on its own initiative
could explore the reliability and relevance of expert evidence in
depth, including by examination of sponsoring witnesses.
The Executive Order should provide that an agency's final
rulemaking notice must include a clear and record-supported
statement detailing and demonstrating the relevance and reliability
rationales for all (i) supporting agency-supplied scientific and
technical information that has been placed in dispute and (ii) any
outside expert scientific and technical information that is relied
upon to support some part of the final agency action. This
statement of scientific and technical basis would provide the
primary guide to judicial review.
Appendix A to this article is a draft Executive Order
supplementing Executive Order 12866 to achieve these goals. We
believe that the OMB Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs should give prompt and favorable consideration to a
proposed Order along these lines.
"1 joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
120 Such proceedings are authorized respectively by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26 and Federal Rule of Evidence 102.
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VI. Conclusion
Administrative agencies play a useful role in protecting the
public-health and safety, but for too long they have been allowed
to make decisions based on loosely scrutinized expert evidence
concerning the nature, causes and remedies for environmental,
health and safety problems. Now that the judiciary has
strengthened its resolve to ensure rational scientific and technical
decisionmaking by admitting only expert evidence that meets the
standards of relevance and reliability, administrative agencies
similarly must ensure that agency decisions affecting critical
liberty and property interests do not rely on the sort of unreliable,
speculative science that the Supreme Court rejected in 1993, 1997,
1999, and 2000.
The tide has turned against scientific and technical
speculation and the unfair and costly consequences it leaves in its
wake. The standards for treatment of scientific and technical
evidence embodied in the Daubert decision and Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 must be fully incorporated into agency
decisionmaking in order to provide a rational and sustainable
system of agency governance. The basic legal framework
governing agency action is consistent with the achievement of that
objective, and an insistence on Daubert discipline is beginning to
be seen in the judicial review of agency actions. To speed the
inevitable and put supporting procedures in place expeditiously,
we urge President Bush to issue an Executive Order along the lines
of Appendix A to implement the Daubert principles at the agency
level.
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APPENDIX A - Illustrative Daubert Executive Order
Executive Order
Ensuring That Rulemaking And Other Regulatory Actions
Are Premised On Reliable And Relevant Scientific and Technical
Information
[Date Issued], 2001
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is
hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Policy
1-101t. The American people rely on Federal
regulatory decision--making to protect and improve their health,
safety, environment, and well-being and to improve the
performance of the economy, without imposing unacceptable,
unreasonable or excessive costs on society. Because Federal
agencies are depositories of significant expertise and experience,
they are responsible for developing regulations and taking other
regulatory actions in a manner that is consistent with applicable
law, the President's priorities and principles set forth by Executive
Order, including Executive Order 12866's directive that Federal
agencies base their decisions on the best obtainable science,
technical, economic and other information concerning the need for
and consequences of their intended actions.
1-102. The Supreme Court's recent decisions in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993), General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) established
and developed the principles that expert opinion testimony on
scientific and technical matters and similar expert evidence must
be shown on the record to be both reliable and relevant before it
may be considered in civil or criminal proceedings governed by the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence 702
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subsequently has been amended to codify the Supreme Court's
decisions.
1-103. This Executive Order establishes the
principles that (a) Federal agencies must base regulations and other
regulatory actions only on scientific and technical information that
is both reliable and relevant, and (b) Federal agencies must
structure their internal and public procedures so that the scientific
and technical information used in such decision-making and the
basis for determining its relevance and reliability are identified,
described and made available for timely public scrutiny and
comment. The Order also establishes obligations and assigns
responsibilities related to the achievement of these goals.
1-104. Each independent regulatory agency is
encouraged to participate in the implementation of this Executive
Order and comply with its provisions.
Section 2. The following definitions shall apply to this
Executive Order.
2-201. "Expert evidence" means opinion or other
evidence that purports to be based on scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge offered by a person qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education.
2-202. "Federal agency" means any authority of the
United States that is an agency under 44 U.S.C. 3502(1) other than
those considered to be independent regulatory agencies under 44
U.S.C. 3502(5). For purposes of this Executive Order, "military
departments," as defined in 5 U.S.C. 102, are covered under the
auspices of the Department of Defense.
2-203. "OIRA" means the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and
Budget.
2-204. "Regulation" or "rule" means an agency
statement of general applicability and future effect, which the
agency intends to have the force and effect of law, that is designed
to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or to describe
the procedure or practice requirements of an agency. It does not,
however, include:
Regulations or rules that pertain to a military or foreign
affairs function of the United States, other than procurement
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regulations and regulations involving the import or export of non-
defense articles and services;
Regulations or rules that are limited to agency organization,
management, or personnel matters; or
Any other category of regulations exempted by the
Administrator of OIRA.
2-205. "Regulatory action" means any substantive
action by an agency (normally published in the Federal Register)
that promulgates or is expected to lead to the promulgation of a
final rule or regulation, including notices of inquiry, advance
notices of proposed rulemaking, and notices of proposed
rulemaking.
2-206. "Relevant" scientific and technical
information means information which is "reliable" within the
meaning of Section 2-207 of this Executive Order and otherwise
meets the standards of Section 3-301 of this Executive Order and
which directly supports the conclusion which the agency proposes
to draw from it.
2-207. "Reliability," with respect to scientific and
technical information, means an expert opinion or similar body of
information that meets the standards of Section 3-301. There is no
mechanical test for determining whether principles and methods
are reliable, and the appropriate analysis may vary with the type of
scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge being
considered. Factors bearing on a methodology's reliability may, in
appropriate instances, include (1) whether the theory or technique
can be tested to see if it can be falsified, (2) whether the theory or
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication, (3)
the known or potential rate of error and the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation,
and (4) general acceptance, meaning explicit identification of a
relevant professional community and an express determination of a
particular degree of acceptance within that community.
Section 3. Implementation and Coordination
3-301. Standards. Each Federal agency shall take
the steps necessary to ensure that in promulgating, amending or
otherwise modifying regulations as defined in Section 2-204, all
scientific and technical information on which the agency relies:
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(1) is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) is the product of
reliable principles and methods, and (3) reflects application of such
principles and methods reliably to the facts or data. This standard
is intended to ensure that scientific and technical information relied
upon to support a rule or other regulatory action constitutes
relevant and reliable knowledge, as distinct from mere speculation
or subjective belief. This rule applies equally to information
generated within an agency and to information submitted by other
agencies or private parties.
3-302. Procedures. To the extent that such action is
not inconsistent with an agency's authorizing statutes, the
Administrative Procedure Act, and other governing law, each
agency shall, not later than 180 days following the date of this
Executive Order, amend its relevant procedures to incorporate the
following requirements, steps, and features:
Public materials defining procedures applicable to agency
rulemaking and similar decision-making processes shall declare
expressly the agency's policy to follow the principles specified in
this Order.
Federal Register notices and similar written notices of
proposed agency action that involve an opportunity for public
participation prior to a final decision shall include a separately
identified section describing any scientific or technical information
upon which the agency proposes to rely. This section shall include
a detailed written explanation of why the agency believes such
information meets the standards set forth in Section 3-301 of this
Order.
Agency rules or notices shall make express that scientific
or technical information submitted in response to the notice
required by subsection (2) shall be accompanied by a
demonstration establishing that such information meets the
standards set forth in Section 3-301 and that failure to present such
a demonstration will preclude the agency from relying upon the
submission in taking final agency action.
Where public comments or similar responses to an agency
proposal fairly call into question whether proposed scientific or
technical information upon which the agency proposes to rely
meets the standards set forth in Section 3-301 of this Order, the
agency, to the extent permitted by law, shall employ oral hearings
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or appropriate written procedures to develop a record as to whether
the subject information meets the Section 3-301 standards.
Federal Register notices and similar written notices of final
agency rulemaking action or similar final agency action shall
include in their statement of basis and purpose a separately
captioned discussion of any issues raised during the related
proceedings as to compliance with the terms of this Executive
Order and shall include an explanation of the agency's record
bases and rationale for resolving each such issue. Where the final
action relies on scientific or technical information not addressed by
the agency proposal(s), the discussion required by this subsection
shall include a detailed description of the agency's basis for
concluding that such information meets the standards set forth in
Section 3-301.
3-303. Coordination and Supervision.
OIRA Responsibilities. The Administrator of OIRA shall
provide meaningful guidance and oversight so that each agency's
regulatory procedures and actions are consistent with the principles
and requirements set forth in this Executive Order.
3.304. Applicability. This Executive Order applies
to any rulemaking or similar regulatory action that is initiated, or
for which a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is published, six
months after the date of this Order.
Section 4. General
4-401. Judicial Review. Nothing in this Executive
Order shall affect, any otherwise available judicial review of
agency action. This Executive Order is intended only to improve
the internal management of the Federal Government and does not
create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable
at law or equity by a party against the United States, its agencies or
instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.
4-402. This Executive Order is intended to
supplement but not supersede Executive Order 12866.
GEORGE W. BUSH
THE WHITE HOUSE
[Date signed], 2001
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